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1. INTRODUCTION
Margaret Thatcher once said of the political process, "You
don't make a decision until you have to."' Although the Supreme
Court is the least political branch of government, it appears to have
adopted Thatcher's policy of not making a decision until necessary,
particularly when it comes to controversial social issues. Some of the
most controversial social issues facing the United States today are
those relating to gay rights, most notable among them the question of
gay marriage. 2 However, numerous other gay rights issues are also
on the national agenda.3
Despite the proliferation of questions pertaining to gay rights,
the Supreme Court has recently denied review in several gay rights-
I Decision Making Quotes, CHATNA, http://chatna.com/theme/decision making.htm (last vi-
sited Sept. 3, 2011).
2 See generally, e.g., Michael A. Lindenberger, After Maine, the Battle Lines Over Gay Mar-
riage Harden, TIvE. Nov. 10. 2009. available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599.1936746,00.html?iid-tsmodulehttp://www.t
ime.com/time/nation
article/0,8599,1936746,00.html; Oren Dorell, State Ballots Tackle Controversial Issues
Tuesday, USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 2009, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-11-01-referendums-state N.html; Sean Prophet,
Why Gay Marriage Is Such a Big Deal, THE AMERICAN CHRONICLE, Nov. 8, 2009, available
at http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/127609.
See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, Parents to Supreme Court: Allow Civil Rights Lawsuit over
School's Homosexual Indoctrination of Children, June 5. 2008.,
http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2008 jun/080605 13.html; Massachusetts: Asylum Denied,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/us/27brfs-
ASYLUMISDENT BRF.html; (Transgender, Bisexual, and) Gay Renters to Get Some Dis-
crimination Protection, Trans Talk, http://destranstalk.blogspot.com/ (Oct. 30, 2009, 11:52
EST).
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related cases.4 Nonetheless, as gay rights issues continue to be a
prominent cultural and media concern, the Supreme Court is ap-
proaching the moment where it must make a decision on some of
them. Indeed, the Supreme Court has not made a significant ruling in
the gay rights arena since it decided Lawrence v. Texas nearly seven
years ago.5
However, gay rights issues are not the only controversial topic
the Supreme Court has recently evaded. Immigration issues like asy-
lum claims are another divisive social problem currently facing the
United States.6 Although the Supreme Court has been more willing
to decide certain immigration cases than it has gay rights matters, it
has yet to confront a number of difficult asylum issues as well.7
4 See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley. 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008). cert. denied, 555 U.S. 815 (2008)
(The Court denied certiorari in parental rights case over whether parents have the right to
opt-out of public school classes on homosexual issues. The case was appealed from the First
Circuit, which held that the parents "failed to demonstrate a constitutionally significant bur-
den on their free exercise or parental due process rights" and "on their children's free exer-
cise rights."); Hudson Area Schools v. Patterson, 551 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2008), cert denied,
130 S. Ct. 299 (2009) (The Court denied certiorari on appeal from the Sixth circuit, where a
Michigan school district sought to dismiss a lawsuit filed by the parents of a student who
was allegedly being repeatedly harassed, and called "queer" and "faggot." The Sixth Circuit
held that the case should proceed to trial, and because the Supreme Court refused to hear the
school's appeal. the parents' lawsuit will now be heard in a federal district court in Detroit.);
Rector of Saint James Parish v. Protestant Episcopal Church Diocese of Los Angeles. 198
P.3d 66 (2009), cert denied 130 S. Ct. 179 (2009) (The Court denied certiorari where the Ep-
iscopal Church in Los Angeles sought to break away from the national denomination be-
cause the denomination allowed the consecration of a gay bishop. The California Supreme
Court's ruling that the church could not take church property after breaking away from the
denomination was upheld).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986). But see Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2995 (2010) (holding
that public university sponsored school group could not discriminate based on sexual orien-
tation).
See, e.g. Sandra Sanchez-Naert, Anti-Immigrant Leaders Exploit Fears, IOWA
IMMIGRATION EDUCATION COALITION, (Nov. 11, 2009),
http://www.iowaimmigrationeducation.org/index.cfmnodelD=1 9036&action=display&new
sID=505: These Two Debates Don't Mix. THE SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, Nov. 10, 2009,
available at
http://news.google.com/news/search?aq-f&pz=1&cf-all&ned-us&hl-en&q-immigration+r
eform.
7 Cf Neguise v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2008) (holding the "persecutor exception" does not
prohibit asylum for refugee who is compelled against his will to participate in acts of perse-
cution), with Kim v. Holder, 560 S. Ct. 393 (2009) (Supreme Court declined to decide
whether 8 U.S.C. 1256(a)'s five-year limitation on the government's authority to rescind the
grant of an adjustment to permanent resident status also precludes the initiation of removal
proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1229(a) based on the unlawfulness of that adjustment).
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The world of gay rights and immigration collide with respect
to whether sexual orientation or sexual identity8 should be regarded
as a particular social group or its own distinct category for purposes
of obtaining asylum in the United States. 9 Although seeking asylum
on such grounds has become increasingly common in the last several
years,10 the Supreme Court has yet to issue any meaningful guidance
with respect to this issue. The Supreme Court's avoidance is particu-
larly problematic because there is a split among the circuit courts ad-
dressing such cases." This has led to forum shopping and inconsis-
tency in asylum decisions.12 This article takes the position that
despite the tension surrounding controversial social issues, it is im-
perative that the Supreme Court clarify asylum based on sexual iden-
tity claims in a timely manner. Doing so, this article maintains, will
preserve the integrity of the federal appellate system, keep public
opinion on gay rights issues moving in a more tolerant direction, and
conform to the American tradition and trajectory of expanding legal
equality.
Part I of this article provides a history of the federal appellate
system, noting the detrimental impact circuit splits can have on the
resolution of a particular legal issue. Part II sets out the history and
the current state of asylum and sexual identity claims in the United
States. Part III provides an analysis of when the Supreme Court has
historically intervened in previous social controversies, such as se-
gregation, interracial marriage, and gay rights in the context of subs-
tantive due process. Part IV discusses the importance of timely Su-
preme Court intervention in asylum sexual identity matters,
particularly as issues surrounding gay marriage continue to loom over
the horizon. 13
8 In accordance with other legal scholars addressing this issue, for the purposes of this ar-
ticle, I will use the term "sexual identity" to encompass both sexual identity and sexual
orientation, as it is broader and more encompassing.
9 See Paul O'Dwyer, A Well-Founded Fear ofHaving My Sexual Orientation Asylum Claim
Heard in the Wrong Court, 52 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 185, 186 fn.1 (2008).
10 Id. at 186.
11 Compare Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzalez, 458 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006) (in which the
Ninth Circuit displays sympathy for such claims), with Kimumwe v. Gonzalez, 431 F.3d
319, 323 (8th Cir. 2005) (in which the Eighth Circuit denied such a claim).
12 See supra, note 11.
See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger. 702 F.Supp.2d 1132,1138 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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II. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL APPELLATE SYSTEM
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have an extensive
history that dates back to the country's founding.14 The circuit
courts' formation derives from the United States Constitution,15
which provides: "The judicial power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish."1 6 However, the
Constitution did not make any provisions for the organization or pro-
cedures of the Supreme Court or any inferior Courts, leaving Con-
gress to decide them.17 Thus, Congress was given "the absolute and
complete authority" to "create courts as it deemed necessary to assist
in the administration of the federal court system."18
With the passage of the Judiciary Act on September 24, 1789,
Congress established the groundwork for the nation's federal judi-
ciary. 19 The Act provided that the Supreme Court should "consist of
a chief justice and five associate justices" and that the Court should
hold two sessions annually. 20 The Act also provided that the nation
should be divided into thirteen districts (one for each of the original
colonies), and that those districts should be divided into three circuits
-the eastern, the middle and the southern.21 However, these three
circuits were quite different from circuit courts today. The circuit
courts did not have judges of their own; the Act provided that two
Supreme Court justices and one district court judge would preside
over the courts in each circuit.22 Further, the circuit courts func-
tioned primarily as trial, rather than appellate courts. 23 The Act also
established the circuit courts' jurisdiction, providing for original ju-
risdiction over civil cases involving diversity jurisdiction of at least
$500 or where the United States was a plaintiff, and serious criminal
offenses, as well as appellate jurisdiction over the district courts. 24
The structure of the Federal judiciary as outlined above re-
mained in place for approximately the next century.25 However, dur-
ing this period, the United States grew substantially in terms of both
14 HARVEY C. COUCH. A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 1891-1981 4 (1984).
'5 Id.
16 U.S. CONST. art. III, § I; see also art. I, § 8 (allowing Congress to establish tribunals infe-
rior to the Supreme Court).
1 Crystal Marchesoni, "United We Stand, Divided We Fall?": The Controversy Surrounding
a Possible Division of the United States Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit, 37 TEx.
TECH L. REV. 1263, 1266 (2005).
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population and ideology.26 As the nation evolved, so did the federal
judiciary. 2 7 By the turn of the century, the federal courts had become
"a highly professional organization, necessitating a more formal and
tiered review process." 28 Accordingly, Congress responded by ex-
panding the United States circuit court system from three to nine cir-
cuits, enlarging the Supreme Court from six to nine justices, 29 and
providing the circuit courts with their own judges. 30
Despite these modifications, the United States Circuit Courts
continued to serve as courts of "mixed appellate-trial jurisdiction." 31
This finally changed in 1891, when Congress passed the Evarts Act,
commonly referred to as the Circuit Court of Appeals Act.32 This
Act essentially annulled the judicial structure established by the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, and established the modern framework for the U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeals as they exist today. 33 Specifically, this Act
formally created nine "circuit courts of appeals," each consisting of
"three judges, of whom shall two should constitute a quorum." 34 In
essence, the newly created circuit courts of appeals replaced the op-
erating structure of the former United States circuit courts, which
were soon abolished.35 As a result of this restructuring, the circuit
19 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (concerning the establishment of the judi-
cial courts of the United States).
20 Id at § 1.
21 Id at § § 2, 4.
22 Id. at § 4.
23 Marchesoni. supra note 18, at 1267.
24 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20. § 11, 1 Stat. 73. 78-79 (1789).
25 Blake Denton. While the Senate Sleeps: Do Contemporary Events Warrant a New Inter-
pretation of the Recess Appointments Clause?, 58 CATH. U. L. REv. 751,762 (2009).
26 COUCH, supra note 14, at 17.
27 Denton, supra note 25, at 762.
28 Id
29 Judiciary Act of 1837, ch. 34. § 1, 5 Stat. 176. 176-77 (1837).
30 Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, §1-2 16 Stat. 44-45 (1869); Philip D. Oliver, Systematic
Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for
Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47 OHo ST. L.J. 799. 833 (1986).
3 Denton, supra note 25. at 762-63, (quoting Daniel J. Meador. A Challenge to Judicial Ar-
chitecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts ofAppeals. 56 U. Cm. L. REV.
603, 603 (1989)).
32 See generally Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
33 Denton, supra note 25, at 763.
34 Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517 §§ 2-3, 26 Stat. 826, 826 (1891).
35 COUCH, supra note 14, at 18 (noting that the circuit courts as they existed prior to 1891
were phased out in 1911). See Act of Mar. 11, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475. 36 Stat. 1087
(1911).
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courts of appeals dealt exclusively with appeals from district courts,
and the trials conducted by the former circuit courts were delegated
down to the district courts. 36 The structure of the nation's federal
judicial system as we know it today, consisting of "a three-tier federal
judiciary, with the district court exercising trial jurisdiction and the
other two focused solely on reviewing those decisions" was thus es-
tablished.37
The three-tiered structure established by the Circuit Court Act
of 1891 has served the nation rather well, as evidenced by the fact
that it is still in place today. Although the structure has expanded
considerably since its initial inception, Congress has proved willing
to permit such expansions in order to keep up with burgeoning casel-
oads and to promote the efficiency of the federal appellate system. 38
Currently, the United States is divided into 94 judicial districts, which
are organized into twelve regional circuits and one federal circuit.39
Each of the twelve regional circuits has a court of appeals, designated
by a number. 40 In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has national jurisdiction to hear certain specia-
lized cases. 41 Each circuit court hears appeals from the district courts
located within its circuit, as well as appeals from decisions of federal
administrative agencies.42 At present, there are 179 active circuit
court judges. 43 Given the heavy caseload of the circuit courts and the
vast number of active circuit court judges, divisions between the cir-
cuits are inevitable. The main problem with circuit court splits is that
residents of the United States may be "assured different constitutional
and statutory rights based upon their location within an ad hoc system
of twelve geographic subdivisions." 44
36 Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517 § 4, 26 Stat. 826, 827; COUCH, supra note 14, at 18, n.48.
Denton, supra note 25, at 763.
3 See U.S. Court OfAppeals - Judicial Caseload Profile. UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2008.pl (last visited Sept. 6. 2011).
39 COURTS OF APPEALS.
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/CourtsofAppeals.as
px (last visited Sept. 6. 2011).
40 Id.
41 Id. The Federal Circuit's specialized jurisdiction includes cases such as those involving
patent laws, veterans law, and cases decided by the Court of International Trade and the
Court of Federal Claims.
42 id.
43 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2006).
44 Mark A. Hill. Opening the Door for Bias: The Problem of Applying Transferee Forum
Law in Multidistrict Litigation. 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 341, 353 (2009).
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When the circuit courts are divided as to a particular issue, the
Supreme Court may intervene, particularly if Congress fails to do
so.45 Generally, for the Supreme Court to hear a case, a petitioner
who receives an adverse decision from a federal appellate court must
file a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, detailing why the Su-
preme Court should hear the case. 46 The certiorari process as it is
known today originated in the 1925 Judges' Bill. 47 The Bill provided
the Supreme Court with a discretionary docket in order to lighten the
highest Court's workload, which at that point in time, had increased
dramatically over the past several decades due to "the array of legal
issues [which] multiplied with the growing scale and complexity of
federal law in American life." 48
Since the Bill's passage, the Supreme Court has exercised
significant discretion in choosing which cases it will decide. 49 As
outlined by Supreme Court Rule 10:
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right. but of judicial discretion.
A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.
The following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's
discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important
matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts
with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a
departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's super-
visory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a
way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or
of a United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important
45 Benjamin K. Raybin, "Objection: Your Honor is being Unreasonable!" - Law and Policy
Opposing the Federal Sentencing Order Objection Requirement," 63 VAND. L. REv. 235,
265 (2010).
46 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR MILLER. CIVIL PROCEDURE 6-7 (4th
ed. 2005).
47 Judiciary Act of Feb. 13. 1925. ch. 229.43 Stat. 936: see generally Edward A. Hartnett.
Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years after the Judges 'Bill, 100
COLuiM. L. REV. 1643 (2000).
48 Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Juri-
sprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 392
(2004).
49 Hartnett, supra note 47, at 1644
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question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled b this
Court, or has decided an important feral question in a way that conflicts
with relevant decisions of this Court.
"oSUP. CT. R. 10.
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In addition to the broad discretion awarded to the Justices pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 10, the certiorari process is confidential and
conducted in isolation, i.e., the Justices vote individually without dis-
cussion of the case, their votes are not published, and typically, no
reasoning is provided as to why certiorari was granted or denied. 5
The Justices' individual views on certain issues, particularly
divisive social issues, inevitably influence their decision on whether a
writ of certiorari presents an "important" question. 52 For instance, "a
Justice's views on whether the Court should serve as an engine of so-
cial change will influence how eagerly (or hesitantly) that Justice
reaches out for culturally or politically sensitive cases." 53 However,
"the main purpose of [the Supreme Court's] certiorari jurisdiction [is]
to eliminate circuit splits." 54 The Supreme Court nonetheless finds
some circuit splits immaterial, or that a split is "weak or illusory,
which could mean that there appears to be a split in authority, but one
of the lower court cases forming the split might have been resolved
by alternative means."55 In other words, even a circuit split does not
guarantee that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari as to a particu-
lar issue.56 Rather, the Supreme Court must find that the issue is im-
portant, likely to recur, and unlikely to be resolved by other means.
If a case meets these criteria, and at least four Justices vote to hear
the case, certiorari is granted. 8 In reviewing petitions for certiorari,
the Justices certainly recognize that certain cases involve more divi-
sive and ideologically charged issues than others. 59 Particularly in
cases that involve controversial social issues, "the Court's very deci-
5 Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray. Setting the Social Agenda: Deciding to
Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court. 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 313. 316-17 (2009).
52 Id. at 320.
5 Cordray & Cordray, supra note 51, at 320, n 25 (citing KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR
ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 164
(1993) (noting that Justice Brennan took "an active leadership role in trying to find cases that
would promote his reforms" and noting Justice Harlan's conflicting viewpoint in Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624 25 (1964) (Harlan. J. Dissenting) ("The Constitution is not a pa-
nacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor should this Court. ordained as a judicial
body. be thought of as a general haven for reform movements.")).
54 Nunez v. United States, 554 U.S. 911. 913 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as a Barrier to
Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 941 (2009).
56 Id
5 Id. at 942.
59 Cordray & Cordray, supra note 51, at 314.
2011] 411
412 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XV:2
sion to grant review 'increase[s] the political salience of the issues
decided-regardless of which way the Court decides the issues." 60
As is further discussed later in this article, the Supreme Court
. . .61
can be slow to grant certiorari as to some divisive issues. Despite
its reluctance, the Supreme Court nonetheless has an obligation to
settle circuit splits and decide important constitutional issues, regard-
less of the controversial nature of the issue. 62 When an important is-
sue consistently results in split decisions by the circuit courts, deny-
ing certiorari can be "an abdication of responsibility." 63
Ill. HISTORY OF ASYLUM AND SEXUAL IDENTITY CLAIMS IN THE UNITED
STATES
A. History of Asylum in the United States
The idea of the United States as a sanctuary for the oppressed
goes back to the earliest days of the nation's history.64 Asylum is an
old concept, but it was not given official status in United States im-
migration law until after World War II.65 In the nineteenth century,
the notion of asylum was a status reserved for intellectual rebels who
dared to defy established power, whether by writing or rebellion. 66
This included participants in the 1848 Revolution in Germany or the
60 Id. at 315.
61 See, e.g. Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal, NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 2010, at Al (stating
that the "Supreme Court typically does not get too far ahead of either public opinion or the
law in the majority of states"); see also Naim v. Naim. 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va.), appeal dis-
missed. 350 U.S. 985 (1956), (involving the validity of the Virginia miscegenation statute.
which the Court eventually invalidated in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
62 Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 326 (1998).
63 Id. (quoting Stuart Taylor Jr., Closing Argument: Maybe the Supremes Did the Right
Thing, TEX. LAWYER, 27 (July 15, 1996) (concluding that although denying certiorari is
problematic, it was probably justified in that particular case)).
64 Michael English, Distinguishing True Persecution from Legitimate Prosecution in Ameri-
can Asylum Law, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 109. 109 (2007).
61 See Gervase Coles. Approaching the Refugee Problem Today, in REFUGEES AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 373, 374 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1989) (stating
that the persecution requirement for asylum in the United States was "specifically devised
for a particular geographic problem at a particular time-namely the post- World War II Eu-
ropean refugee problem").
66 Otto Kirchheimer, Asylum, 53 AmERIcAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 983. 986 (December
1959).
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Paris commune.67 After World War II, it became apparent that asy-
lum needed to redefinition for the Twentieth Century. Asylum-
seekers were now fleeing from who they were, which was quite dif-
ferent from Nineteenth Century asylum-seekers, who were fleeing
from what they had done.68 As a result, in December 1948, the Unit-
ed Nations held a conference setting up guidelines for this purpose,
establishing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which de-
clared that people from all over the world had the right to seek asy-
lum.69
The Declaration of Human Rights was followed in July of
1951 by the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 70
The Convention set fourth certain responsibilities and expectations
for signatories to see the fair treatment and processing of refugees,
including asylum-seekers.71 Article 31 bound signatories not to pe-
nalize asylum-seekers who "enter or are present in their territory
without authorized documents provided that they present themselves
without delay to authorities."72 The Convention also provided the
world with a definition of "refugee"-a person who has a "well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, natio-
nality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion."73
In 1967, the basic provisions of the 1951 Convention were in-
corporated into the Protocol to the United Nations Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees, including the above-noted definition of
refugee.74 Shortly thereafter, in 1968, the United States adopted the
1967 Protocol75 In the United States, Congress did not ratify its own
Refugee Act until 1980, when it codified the 1967 Protocol at section
§ 10 1(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 76
6 Id. at 986.
68 English, supra note 64, at 113-114.
69 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III)
(Dec. 10, 1948) available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.
70 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22. 1954) [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
71 1951 Convention. supra note 70, at 6259.
72 Id. at 6275.
73 Id. at 6261.
74 Protocol Relating to the Status ofRefugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,6225, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
75 DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (3d ed. 1999).
76 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.); see ANKIER, supra note 76, at 3.
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Pursuant to current U.S. laws and regulations:
The term "refugee" means . .. any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of. that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race. religion. nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.7 7
In essence, the four fundamental elements of a claim for asy-
lum in the United States are "(1) a well-founded fear, (2) of persecu-
tion, (3) on account of, (4) a protected ground." 78
Although asylum, or more simply freedom from oppression,
has undoubtedly been a central value throughout American history,
notions of American freedom have been a cruel mockery for some
trying to become American citizens. 7 Therefore, consistent and co-
herent asylum laws are necessary to preserve the integrity of the na-
tion's ideals of freedom, justice and equality.
B. Procedure
In order to begin the process of applying for asylum, appli-
cants must first file a Form 1-589 with their local Citizenship and
Immigration Services (CIS) office.8o Each asylum request is also au-
tomatically considered to be a claim for withholding of removal. 8
The main difference between an asylum claim and a claim for with-
holding of removal is that the Attorney General has the discretion to
n 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42); see Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the
Trigger: Separation Violence as a Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women. 59 AM.
U. L. REv. 337, 353 (2009).
78 O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 191.
79 See Maureen O'Connor Hurley, The Asylum Process: Past, Present and Future, 26 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 995 (1992); cf DAVID NGARURI KENNEY & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ASYLUM
DENIED: A REFUGEE'S STRUGGLE FOR SAFETY IN AMERICA 314-315 (Univ. of California
Press 2008); Erin Craddock, Note, Torturous Consequences and the Case of Maher Arar:
Can Canadian Solutions "Cure" the Due Process Deficiencies in U.S. Removal Proceed-
ings?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 621. 644-45 (2008) ("[W]hen the alien faces removal to a coun-
try that engages in torture and, after removal, the alien is in fact tortured, the cost of error is
very high.").
80 8 C.F.R. § 1208.3(a); see also O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 192.
8 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.3 (b); see Joseph Landau, "Soft Immutability"
and "Imputed Gay Identity ": Recent Developments in Transgender and Sexual-Orientation-
Based Asylum Law. 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 237. 240 (2005).
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grant asylum, whereas withholding of removal, once proven, is man-
datory and non-discretionary.82 In addition, one year after being
granted asylum, an asylee may become eligible for permanent resi-
dency in the United States.81
The next step in the process is for the local CIS office to
schedule the applicant for an interview.84 Subsequent to the inter-
view, the application will either be approved or, if not approved, will
either be denied by the asylum Service officer or referred to the Im-
migration Court, depending on whether the applicant has valid immi-
gration status in the United States.85 If the application is denied, "the
officer shall explain in writing the specific reasons for denial," notify
the applicant of their appellate rights "and shall furnish the appropri-
ate appeal form."86 If a case is referred to the Immigration Court, the
application will be sent a notice to appear in Court and placed into
removal proceedings.87
Once the case is before the Immigration Court, the applicant
presents their case before an Immigration Judge (IJ).88 This provides
the applicant with the opportunity "to be heard in 'the more formal
setting of the immigration court where witnesses may be examined
and cross examined by the applicant's counsel and the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) counsel."89 Proceedings before the Im-
82 8 U.S.C. §§1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a). 1231(b)(3); see Kvartenko v. Ashcroft, 33 Fed.
Appx. 262, 264 (2002); see also Michael McGarry, Note: A Statute in Particularly Serious
Need of Reinterpretation: The Particularly Serious Crime Exception to Withholding of Re-
moval, 51 B.C. L. REv. 209, 214 (2010) (noting that withholding of removal "applies a high-
er standard [than asylum], requiring that the alien show a 'clear probability of persecution,'
but when this higher standard is met, the requested relief is mandatory rather than discretio-
nary").
8' 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1)(B).
84 O'Dwyer supra note 9, at 192 n. 37 (stating that "[t]here are seven asylum offices in the
country: Texas, Los Angeles, Chicago, Virginia, Miami, Newark and New York. Some of
the offices have a large geographical jurisdiction and conduct asylum interviews in different
circuit court jurisdictions.").
8 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1 (a)(1)-(a)(2) (2011); see DAVID A. MARTIN ET AL., FORCED MIGRATION
LAW AND POLICY 79 (2007).
86 8 C.F.R. § 103.3 (a) (iii) (2011).
87 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.3(c). 1003.1(i) (2011): see also MARTIN, supra note 85, at 79.
8' 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(b)(3)(i) (2011); see MARTIN, supra note 85, at 80.
89 Leonard Birdsong, "Give Ale Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and Your Victims of Gender Vi-
olence, Yearning to Breathe the Free of Sexual Persecution ... ": The New Grounds for
Grants of Asylum, 32 NOVA L. REV. 357, 365 (2008). On March 1, 2003, the functions of the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service "INS" were transferred to the newly created
Department of Homeland Security. See Homeland Security Act (HSA) Pub. L. 107-296, 116
Stat. 2135, 2205 (2002) (current version at 6 U.S.C § 291 (2002).
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migration Court are conducted de novo.90 At the proceeding, appli-
cants must present evidence to support their asylum claims.91
If parties, whether the applicant or the government, are dissa-
tisfied with the outcome of the Immigration Court proceedings, they
may file an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).92
The BIA is "an administrative appeals tribunal that is part of the Ex-
ecutive Office for Immigration Review in the Department of Justice
(EOIR)."93 The BIA has never been officially recognized by statute;
however, it is governed by the Attorney General's regulations, and
the Attorney General also appoints its members.94 The BIA can (1)
affirm the decision of the IJ without issuing an opinion, (2) adopt and
modify the IJ's opinion, (3) issue its own decision either granting or
denying asylum directly, or (4) remand the case back to the IJ for fur-
ther development.95 BIA decisions can be either precedential or non-
precedential.96 A decision is precedential if it is either selected for
publication by the BIA itself, or if the Attorney General designates
the decision as such.97 Even though the BIA handles a high volume
of claims, very few opinions are designated as precedential deci-
sions. 98
BIA decisions may be appealed to the Federal circuit court of
appeals that has jurisdiction over the area from which the immigra-
tion court proceeding was held.99 Circuit court decisions "are [only]
binding on Immigration Courts in that circuit, and on the BIA's deci-
90 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(d) (2011).
91 Alan G. Bennett, Note, The "Cure" That Harns: Sexual Orientation-Based Asylum and
the Changing Definition ofPersecution. 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 279, 284 (1999). It
should also be noted that in presenting evidence at Immigration Court proceedings, neither
the state nor federal rules of evidence apply; all that is required is that the evidence "be rele-
vant and conform to requirements of constitutional due process." Id.
92 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2011).
93 MARTIN, supra note 85, at 83.
94 d
95 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(201 1); see Bennett, supra note 91, at 285.
96 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(2011).
97 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d) (2011).
98 MARTIN, supra note 85 at 83; see e.g.. In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. 819 n. 1
(B.I.A. 1990) ("[T]his case was decided by the Board on March 12, 1990. By Attorney Gen-
eral Order No. 1895-94, dated June 19, 1994, the Attorney General ordered: 'I hereby desig-
nate the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals in In re: Fidel Toboso-Alfonso (A-
23220644) (March 12, 1990) as precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or is-
sues.'").
99 Immigration Nationality Act § 235(b)(1). 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(2) (2006); see Bennett, supra
note 92. at 285.
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sions reviewing Immigration Court proceedings originating in that
circuit."oo Accordingly, circuit splits often occur because of conflict-
ing rulings among the circuit courts as to certain issues, because of to
a particular issue being adjudicated in one circuit but not another. 101
C. Immigration Exclusions of Sexual and Gender Minorities in the United
States
Despite the fact that in 1783, George Washington proclaimed
the United States to be a land "open to receive the persecuted and op-
pressed of all nations," 102 the United States has frequently expe-
rienced periods marked by sharp hostility towards immigrants and ef-
forts to restrict their entry.103 Thus, within the philosophy of
American asylum is an inherent paradox: while the United States is
proud of its tradition of accepting the world's oppressed, it has also
encountered periods of opposition to this tradition on a regular ba-
S1S. 104
Throughout the nineteenth century, large numbers of immi-
grants flooded both the East and West coasts of the United States. 105
By 1870, nearly half of the residents in several major cities, including
New York City and Chicago were immigrants.106 Accordingly, in
1875, the United States federal government began to regulate immi-
gration. 107 From that point on, the federal government sought to iden-
tify and exclude aliens whose activities would interfere with the eco-
100 O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 193 (citing IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, IMMIGRATION BASICS:
SOURCES OF LAW, available at
http://immigrationequality.org/manual template.php?id=1065#D 2 (last visited Oct. 5,
2011).
'0 O'Dwyer. supra note 9. at 193; Birdsong. supra note 90. at 366 (quoting Bennett. supra
note 92, at 285).
102 GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLON, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA'S
HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT, xiii (Free Press 1986)
103 See generally Kevin R. Johnson, "The Anti-Terrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act
and Ideological Regulation in Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Aon-
Citizens." 28 ST. MARY'S L. J. 834 (1997) (discussing the attempts of the United States to
limit immigration).
10 4 Id. at 834.
Los Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension ofNineteenth Century Immigration Law, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1354 (2009).
10' Id. at 1359 (citing HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (Oxford University Press 2006)).
107 Page Law Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974) (Prior to the passage of this
Act, immigration laws did exist. but were promulgated by the states); see Abrams, supra
note 105, at 1355-56.
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nomic and physical health of the nation and corrupt the morals of its
people.1os For example, in 1912, Nicholas P., a young Greek immi-
grant was deported to Argentina as a "public charge" after confessing
to the Immigration Service that he had engaged in "unnatural inter-
course with men." o0 This case reflects the prevailing attitude in the
United States at that time that sexual nonconformists were physically
as well as mentally degenerate, and thus were excludable from entry
into the United States.11o
In 1917, the government passed a new immigration act that
provided for a new method of exclusion of homosexuals; under the
new act, an individual would be denied entry into the United States if
certified by an examining physician as being "mentally defective" or
afflicted with a "constitutional psychopathic inferiority."111 This Act
reflected then-prevailing medical views that homosexuality was the
product of a serious and permanent psychological defect.112 As a re-
sult of this view, homosexuals were banned from entering the United
States under this provision until it was finally repealed in 1990.113
After World War II, the nation was overcome by "McCarthy-
ism,"114 and at the height of the McCarthy era, Congress revised the
nation's immigration laws.115 One focus of these revisions was the
exclusion of sexual minorities.116 Many who believed in the hype of
McCarthyism believed that homosexuals "shared with Communists
the qualities of being gregarious yet secretive, concealing their true
108 See William Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation
ofSame-Sex Intimacy, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1045 (1997); see also Kerry Abrams, Polyga-
my, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641
(2005) (discussing how the Page Law was designed to prevent Chinese women from migrat-
ing to the United States in the late nineteenth century).
09 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE. JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW 1361
(2d ed. 2004) (noting that in 1885, Congress excluded any "convict, lunatic, idiot or person
unable to take care of himself or herself' as a public charge).
110 Id. at 1361.
1 The Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917); see Laurie Martha Cochran,
Recent Development: The Changing Tide of Immigration Law: Equality for All?, 26 GA. J.
INT'L & COIP. L. 673, 676-677 (1997).
112 ESKRIDGE, supra note 110. at 1361.
..3 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).114 Susan Brooks Thistlewaite, Is Fear ofIslam the New McCarthyism?. WASH. POST, Aug.
1, 2010, available at http:/ newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/undergod/2010/08 (de-
fining the term as "making charges of disloyalty or even subversion without regard for ade-
quate evidence").
115 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 249, 66 Stat. 163, 219 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2009)).
116 Id.
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selves and loyalties, creating coteries and collectives that evaded sur-
veillance."117 Senator Patrick McCarran who headed the subcommit-
tee on immigration reform stated:
The subcommittee believes ... that the purpose of the [1917 Act's] provision
against 'persons with constitutional psychopathic inferiority' will be more ade-
quately served by changing that term to 'persons afflicted with psychopathic
personality,' and that the classes of mentally defectives should be enlarged to
include homosexuals and other sex perverts. 118
Similarly, Senator Kenneth Wherry commented, "[y]ou can't hardly
separate homosexuals from subversives ... A man of low morality is
a menace in the government, and they are all teamed up together."119
The Public Health Service (PHS) revised the Senator's pro-
posal, and the McCarron-Walter Act adopted the PHS's suggested
terminology, which was to exclude persons "afflicted with a mental
disorder, epilepsy, or psychopathic personality."120 However, as the
Senate Judiciary Committee made clear:
[T]he Public Health Service has advised that the provision for the exclusion of
aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality or a mental defect . . . is suffi-
ciently broad to provide for the exclusion of homosexuals and sex perverts.
This change of nomenclature is not to be construed in any way as modifying
the intent to exclude all aliens who are sexual deviates. 121
The provision of the McCarran-Walter Act pertaining to
"psychopathic personalities" was challenged by three cases in the
1950's.122 In Quiroz v. Neely, one of the three cases from the 1950's,
the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case of a Mexican lesbian who was or-
dered deported from the United States for being afflicted with a psy-
chopathic personality pursuant to § 212(a)(4) of the McCarran-Walter
Act.123 The Court looked to the Act's legislative history, cited above,
117 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, FAMILY, UNDERVALUED:
DISCRIMINATION, DENIAL, AND THE FATE OF BINATIONAL SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDER U.S.
LAW 24 (2006).
''
8 Id. at 1362 (quoting S.REP.No. 81-1515. at 345 (1950)).
''9 Id. at 24 n. 48 (quoting Max Lerner, "The Senator and the Purge." N. Y. PosT. (July 17.
1950). quoted in JONATHAN KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE
U.S.A. 95 (New York: Harper Colophon, 1976).
120 ESKRIDGE, supra note 109, at 1363.
121 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 117, at 25 n. 53 (quoting (S. REP. No. 1137, at 9
(1952))).
122 Robert J. Foss, The Demise of the Homosexual Exclusion: The New Possibilities for Gay
and Lesbian Immigration, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 439, 454 (1994) (discussing the histo-
ry of homosexuality as a "psychopathic personality" disorder in immigration law).
123 Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906. 907 (5th Cir. 1961).
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for a clearer meaning of the phrase "psychopathic personality," and
held that Congress intended the phrase to include homosexuals. 124
One year later, in Fleuti v. Rosenberg, the Ninth Circuit found
that the phrase "psychopathic personality" was too vague to apply to
homosexuality in general, thus making the statute void for ambigui-
ty. 12 5 In 1963, a divided Supreme Court affirmed the decision, but
none of the Justices were comfortable protecting homosexuals from
exclusion.126 In response, in 1965, Congress further clarified the
phrase "psychopathic personality" by adding the term "sexual devia-
tion" to the list of reasons for exclusion. 127
Two years after Congress amended the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, in 1967, the Supreme Court reiterated its position that
homosexuals fit into the category of persons "afflicted with psycho-
pathic personality" and could therefore be excluded from admission
into United States.128 In Boutilier v. INS., an alien who had had ho-
mosexual relations about three or four times a year for over five years
immediately preceding entry into the United States was ordered de-
ported on the ground that he was afflicted with a psychopathic perso-
nality. 129 Boutilier challenged the constitutionality of the phrase
"psychopathic personality" on vagueness grounds; however, the Su-
preme Court disagreed, holding that the term "sexual deviation" was
not unconstitutionally vague, and was therefore a valid means to ex-
clude homosexuals from the United States.130 This decision, in com-
bination with the 1965 amendment, left no doubt that the borders of
the United States were closed to homosexuals at that time.
However, it is important to note that when the Court decided
Boutilier only a small percentage of people in the United States were
124 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 82-1137, at 9 (1955)).
125 Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 374 U.S.
449 (1963).
126 Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 451 (1963) ("we have concluded that there is a thre-
shold issue of statutory interpretation in the case, the existence of which obviates decision
here as to whether s 212(a)(4) is constitutional as applied to respondent."); see ESKRIDGE &
HUNTER, supra note 109, at 1363.
127 Immigration and Nationality Act. Pub. L. No. 89 236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (1965)
(repealed 1990): see Jin S. Park. Pink Asylum: Political Asylum Eligibility of Gay Men and
Lesbians Under U.S. Immigration Policy, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1115, 1118-1119 (1995).
128 Boutilier v. INS., 387 U.S. 118, 121 (1967).
129 Id. at I 19.
130 Id. at 120. In this decision, the Court also reaffirmed Congress's plenary power to make
rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess certain characteristics. Id.
at 124.
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openly gay or lesbian.131 This changed almost overnight as a result of
the police raid of the Stonewall Inn on June 26, 1969.132 During the
raid, a number of homosexuals fought back against the police, mark-
ing the beginning of the gay rights movement. 133 Soon after in 1970,
gay activists protested at the American Psychiatric Association's
(APA) annual convention in San Francisco to have homosexuality
removed as a disorder from the APA's diagnostic manual, the DSM-
II.134
In response to continuous pressure from gay activists as well
as from psychologists inside the profession, the AAP removed homo-
sexuality from the list of psychopathologies in 1973.135 In 1979, the
Surgeon General of the United States "ordered [his] personnel not to
issue Class A certificates excluding aliens solely because those aliens
were suspected of being homosexual."136
As a result of these changes, the I.N.S. developed a new pro-
cedure whereby aliens arriving in the United States were no longer
questioned about their sexual orientation. 13 7 In Hill v. U.S.IN.S., the
Ninth Circuit stated that
On September 9, 1980, the INS adopted 'Guidelines and Procedures for the In-
spection of Aliens Who Are Suspected of Being Homosexual', which provide
that an arriving alien will not be asked any questions regarding his or her sexual
preference. If an alien 'makes an unambiguous oral or written admission of
homosexuality' or if a third person who is also presenting himself or herself for
inspection 'voluntarily states, without prompting or prior questioning, that an
alien who arrived in the United States at the same time . . . is a homosexual,'
the alien may be examined privately by an immigration official and asked to
sign a statement declaring he or she is homosexual. A hearing is held before an
William N. Eskridge. Jr. Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Condi-
tions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 817, 958 (1997).
132 Jackie Gardina, The Tipping Point: Legal Epidemics, Constitutional Doctrine, and the
Defense of Marriage Act, 34 VT. L. REv. 291, 300 n.67 (2009) (noting that "The 1969
Stonewall Riots mark the advent of the modern gay liberation movement.").
133 Id.
134 See generally RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE
POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS 103-05 (1981): Gary Alinder, Gay Liberation Meets the Shrinks, in
OUT OF THE CLOSETS: VOICES OF GAY LIBERATION 141. 141. 143 (Karla Jay & Allen Young
eds., 1972).
'3 Jorge L. Carro, From Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority to AIDS: What is in the Fu-
ture for Homosexual Aliens?, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 201, 212-13 (1989).
13 Id. at 212-13 (noting that "[lt]he American Psychiatric Association adopted a resolution
on December 15, 1973, declaring that 'homosexuality per se implies no impairment in judg-
ment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities.'" ); D. KNUTSON,
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW 21 n.42 (1980).
In Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1473 (1983).
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Immigration Judge and the alien is excluded based on his admissions. 138
Initially, therefore, the procedure allowed the entry of an alien so
long as he did not volunteer information that he was homosexual or a
third party arriving simultaneously did not identify the alien as homo-
sexual.13 However, the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that the INS
could not exclude a self-declared homosexual alien without medical
certification from the PHS.140
In 1990, Congress finally decided to revise the provisions of
the Walter-McCarran Act.141 Openly-gay Congressman Barney
Frank and several others voiced strong opposition to the psychopathic
personality exclusion altogether.142 Consequently, the exclusion was
finally completely eliminated by the Immigration Act of 1990.143 The
1990 Act carried with it significant implications for homosexual ref-
ugees seeking entry into the United States, for it offered the novel
possibility of attaining political asylum.144 Since asylees and refugees
must first be admissible as immigrants into the United States, the re-
peal of the phrase "psychopathic personality," which served to ex-
clude homosexuals for decades, granted homosexuals the opportunity
to apply for asylum for the first time under the Refugee Act of
1980.145
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1481; but see In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding the I.N.S.
may enforce exclusion of homosexuals without the cooperation of the Public Health Ser-
vice).
141 See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
142 See Shannon Minter, Sodomy and Public Morality Offenses Under U.S. Immigration
Law: Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 771, 771-72, n. 5 (1993)
(noting that "Frank had introduced bills revising the grounds for exclusion and deportation
since 1983"). See also Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 1983: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong. 193 (1983): H.R. Rep. No. 100-882. at 23-24 (noting that others who attempted
to repeal the provision included Representative Julian Dixon (H.R. 2815. 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1984)); Senator Alan Cranston (S. 1086, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984)); and Repre-
sentative Edward Roybal (H.R. 4909, 98th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1984))); Peter Fowler & Leo-
nard Graff, Gay Aliens and Immigration: Resolving the Conflict Between Hill and Longstaff
10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 621, 639-40 (1985) (summarizing legislative attempts to repeal the
provision through 1985).
143 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
144 Foss, supra note 122 at 469.
145 id. at 469.
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D. Inconsistencies in Adjudicating Sexual Orientation and Identity Asylum
Claims
One of the main sources of inconsistency in applying asylum
law in the various circuit courts is the lack of definitions for certain
statutory terms. 146
1. Particular Social Group
A number of cases in the 1990s found that sexual identity
could provide the basis for a legitimate asylum claim based upon
homosexuals as members of a particular social group. 147 The first of
these cases is In re Toboso-Alfonso. 148 In that case, a 40-year-old na-
tive citizen of Cuba, who came to the United States in June of 1980
as part of the Mariel boat lift, applied for asylum on the basis that he
was a "homosexual who [had] been persecuted in Cuba and would be
persecuted again on account of that status" should he be forced to re-
turn there.149 This case was the "first known instance in United States
immigration law where a homosexual was cast as a member of a par-
ticular social group [Cuban gays] and permitted to successfully allege
persecution on that basis."150
Toboso-Alfonso was followed by In re Tenorio in 1993.151 In
that case, a Brazilian gay man who feared persecution at the hands of
paramilitary groups after suffering a beating in Rio de Janeiro as part
of a "gay bashing" incident was granted asylum.152 Soon after, in
1994, Attorney General Janet Reno published a "directive mandating
that the Immigration system adopt Toboso-Alfonso as precedent." 153
It thus became clear that sexual minorities could base asylum claims
on their membership in a particular social group, if they still met the
other general asylum requirements. 154 Thus, although sexual identity
has been recognized as falling within the "particular social group"
146 Birdsong, supra note 89, at 368.
147 See, e.g., In re Toboso-Alfonso. 20 1. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 1990): In re Tenorio, No. A72
093 558 (EOIR Immigr. Ct. July 26. 1993).
148 Toboso-Alfonso. 20 1. & N. Dec. 819.
149 Id. at 820.
150 Robert C. Leitner, Note, A Flawed System Exposed: The Immigration Ajudicatory System
and Asylum for Sexual Minorities, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 679, 686 (2004).
151 Tenorio, No. A72 093 558.
152 Id.
. Leitner. supra note 150, at 687.
154 Id.
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category since In re Toboso-Alfonso was designated as a precedential
opinion in 1994, this precedent has been inconsistently applied. 155
2. Homosexual Acts Versus Homosexual Identity
Sexual identity is not one of the enumerated categories found
in the definition of asylum. 156 Accordingly, based on the holding of In
re Toboso-Alfonso, most refugees seeking asylum in the United
States on account of their sexual identity do so based on their mem-
bership in a particular social group. 15 7 Currently, however, there is no
universally accepted definition of "particular social group."18 The
Ninth Circuit has most frequently held that "alien homosexuals" con-
stitute a particular social group for asylum purposes; 159 however, case
law regarding the definition of a "particular social group" is not
wholly consistent, even amongst that circuit. 160
Although the adoption of Toboso-Alfonso as precedent greatly
facilitated the path of individuals seeking asylum on the basis of per-
secution based on their sexual identity, it remains unclear who exact-
ly falls within this decision.161 For example, in some circuits, a ho-
mosexual who has lived an openly gay or lesbian lifestyle, and who
has been identified as homosexual or harassed or threatened because
of his or her status as a gay man or lesbian typically falls within the
ruling.162 However, it remains unclear whether or not an individual
155 See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec 819-22 (B.I.A. 1990). Compare In re Tenorio,
No. A72 093 558, *1101 (EOIR Immigr. Ct. July 26, 1993), and Karouni v. Gonzales, 399
F. 3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005), with Arrieta v. INS, 117 F.3d 429, 430 (9th Cir. 1996).
15 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) 2006.
17 Leitner. supra note 150, at 687.
58 Hernandez-Montiel v. INS. 225 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2000).
15 See, e.g.. Karouni v. Gonzales. 399 F.3d at 1172.
160 Compare In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211. 233 (BIA 1985) (This case held that '"perse-
cution on account of membership in a particular social group' to mean persecution that is
directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of all persons all of who share a
common, immutable characteristic." Thus, a group of taxi drivers did not meet the immuta-
ble characteristic requirement because an occupation can change. Thus, driving a taxi is not
fundamental to a person's identity). with Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS. 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding the existence of a voluntary associational relationship among the pur-
ported members, which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to their
identity as a member, constitutes a social group).
161 See e.g. Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 643-45 n. 5 (1997). See generally Stephen
Howard, Gay Asylum Seekers Win Appeal to Stay, THE INDEPENDENT, July 7, 2010, available
at http://www.independent.co.uldnews/uk/home-news/gay-asylum-seekers-win-appeal-to-
stay-2020354.html?service=Print.
162 See e.g. Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 643-45 n.5 (1997) (concerning a Russian les-
bian who was arrested, beaten and imprisoned for participating in a demonstration by a les-
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who merely identifies himself or herself as homosexual, but does not
frequently engage in homosexual acts and has lived discreetly as a
homosexual, would qualify.163 In this regard, in In re Toboso-
Alfonso, the BIA drew a clear distinction between persecution based
on homosexual acts and homosexual identity.164 However, as it per-
tains to asylum law generally, this distinction appears to be arbi-
trary. 165 For example, those persons claiming persecution on account
of their religion do so on grounds of belonging to a particular reli-
gion, as opposed to engaging in religious acts such as praying, attend-
ing services, or observing certain religious holidays.166 Nonetheless,
in asylum cases based on sexual orientation or identity, 'judges still
fall back on this artificial distinction in order to justify denials of re-
lief to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender ("LGBT") appli-
cants."Gs
The Ninth Circuit, which is typically regarded as the most
sympathetic toward sexual orientation and identity asylum claims,
has acknowledged that the social group category is "a flexible one
which extends broadly to encompass many groups who do not other-
wise fall within the other categories of race, nationality, religion, or
political opinion."168 In Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, for example, the
Ninth Circuit held "that a 'particular social group' is one united by a
voluntary association, including a former association, or by an innate
characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of
its members that members either cannot or should to be required to
change it." 169 Applying that standard to appellant Hernandez-
Montiel, who claimed persecution on account of his homosexuality
bian youth organization of which she was a member; appellant was subsequently forced to
undergo treatment at a clinic to cure her lesbianism. Appellant was allowed to pursue her
asylum claim as a member of the persecuted social group "Russian lesbians" under Toboso-
Alfonso).
163 As is discussed later in this article, the previous standard applied in the United Kingdom
was that one who was homosexual but discreetly concealed his or her sexual identity was not
subject to persecution, and therefore not eligible for asylum. This standard was recently
overturned. See Howard, supra note 161.
164 In re Toboso-Alfonso. 20 1. & E. Dec. at 823: see also O'Dwyer. supra note 9. at 196
(stating that "[t]he language of the decision certainly suggests that the BIA would have been
less sympathetic to a claim of persecution on account of those homosexual acts rather than
homosexual status").
165 O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 196.
166 id
167 id.
168 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571. 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
169 Hernandez-Montiel v. INS. 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000).
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and his female sexual identity, the Ninth Circuit found that his female
sexual identity was such a part of him that "[he] should not be re-
quired to change [it]."17o
More recently, in Ayala v. U.S. Attorney General, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a Venezuelan man
who identified as a homosexual and who had been diagnosed with the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) was a member of a particular
social group: "that of HIV-positive homosexual men."171 The BIA
determined that Ayala had not proven persecution because of his
membership in this particular social group. However, the Eleventh
Circuit vacated the BIA decision and remanded Mr. Ayala's petition
to reconsider his testimony and other facts that lent credibility to his
assertions that he was in fact persecuted because of his sexual identi-
ty.172
The Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Ayala is important because it
reflects another recent trend in homosexual asylum claims. Although
circuit courts are increasingly willing to accept In re Toboso-
Alfonso 's mandate that sexual identity is sufficient to meet the re-
quirements of membership in a particular social group, many lower
court decisions still reflect a reluctance to grant asylum for those per-
secuted because of their homosexuality.173 The BIA's decision in
Ayala demonstrates that even though an applicant may be accepted as
a member of a particular social group, immigration decisions are now
often finding that an applicant was not persecuted because of that sta-
tus. 174
170 Id. at 1094; see also Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzalez, 458 F.3d 1052, 1054, 1056 n.3 (9 th Cir.
2006).
1 Ayala v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 946-47 (11th Cir. 2010).
172 Id. at 946-51.
171 Id. at 949 (citing In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. 819, 822 23 (BIA 1990)).
174 See Razkane v. Holder, 562 F.3d 1283, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 2009) ("The IJ determined
that Razkane had not made the necessary showing that it was more likely than not he would
be persecuted on account of his membership in a particular social group, homosexuals, upon
return to Morocco. Razkane appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The BIA issued a brief order adopting and affirming the IJ's decision." The Court reversed.
requiring the BIA to consider Razkane's persecution resulting from his status as a homosex-
ual. 562 F.3d at 1289.); Kadri v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that ap-
pellant "filed a petition for asylum on the ground that he was persecuted in Indonesia be-
cause of his sexual orientation. He asserted that he was ostracized in the workplace and
prevented from earning a livelihood as a medical doctor; and that he fears that if returned to
Indonesia. he would face continued persecution. An Immigration Judge found him credible,
found that he belonged to a particular social group, and granted him asylum. The Depart-
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Despite this uncertainty, it appears that the liberal Ninth Cir-
cuit is paving the way towards a policy of allowing sexual identity to
constitute a particular social group for asylum purposes. 175 As noted
earlier in this section, in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, the Court al-
lowed the asylum claim of Mexican homosexual with a female sexual
identity. 176 Although Hernandez-Montiel engaged in homosexual acts
also, the Court phrased its holding in terms of his sexual identity. 177
The Court stated "[s]exual orientation and sexual identity are immut-
able; they are so fundamental to one's identity that a person should
not be required to abandon them,"178 and acknowledged that "homo-
sexuality encompasses far more than people's sexual proclivities.
Too often homosexuals have been viewed simply with reference to
their sexual interests and activity. Usually, the social context and
psychological correlates of homosexual experience are largely ig-
nored." 179
Similarly, in 2005, the Ninth Circuit allowed the asylum
claim of Jose Patricio Boer-Sedano, a Mexican homosexual with
AIDS. 180 Boer-Sedano testified that "he could not live a 'gay life
openly in Mexico' because of how he would be treated if his sexuali-
ty were known." 18 "Despite his attempts to conceal his sexual identi-
ty, others could perceive [his homosexuality] and Boer-Sedano was
ostracized by his family, friends and coworkers on this basis."182 In
addition, he was harassed and beaten by a high-ranking police offic-
er. 183 By allowing Boer-Sedano's claim, the Court has acknowledged
that homosexuals may still suffer persecution on account of their sex-
ual identity, even if attempts were made to conceal this identity. 184
ment of Homeland Security appealed to the BIA and the BIA reversed the decision of the
I." The Court reversed, instructing the BIA to determine if Kadri suffered past persecution
because of his membership in a particular social group. 543 F.3d at 22).
175 See Hernandez-Montiel v. TNS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000); Boer-Sedano v.
Gonzalez, 418 F. 3d 1082, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2005); Karouni v. Gonzalez, 399 F. 3d 1163,
1171-72 (9th Cir. 2005).
176 Hernandez-Montiel. at 1087.
177 Id. at 1096.
178 d. at 1093.
1 Id. (quoting Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536
A.2d 1, 35 (D.C. 1987)).
180 Boer-Sedano v. Gonzalez, 418 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 2005).
181 Id
182 Id. at 1085-86.
.. Id. at 1086.
184 See id. at 1085-86.
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Likewise, in Karouni v. Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the distinction between homosexual acts and homosexual identity in
allowing the asylum application of a gay man from Lebanon. 185 In
that case, the Court held:
[W]e see no appreciable difference between an individual, such as Karouni, be-
ing persecuted for being a homosexual and being persecuted for engaging in
homosexual acts. The persecution Karouni fears. regardless of how it is cha-
racterized by the Attorney General, qualifies as persecution on account of ...
Karouni's membership in the particular social group of homosexuals. 186
More recently, in Razkane v. Holder, the Tenth Circuit reversed
and remanded the claim of a Moroccan gay man because of com-
ments made by the IJ who denied the application impermissibly re-
lied on preconceived assumptions about homosexuals, resulting in
appearance of bias or hostility that precluded meaningful review by
Court of Appeals.187 Adapting the reasoning used in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the Court criticized the IJ's analysis, which involved noting a
distinction between homosexual status and homosexual conduct in a
country like Morocco, which criminalizes homosexual conduct. 188
The IJ then determined whether Mr. Razkane would be identified as a
homosexual in Morocco, but in so doing, "relied on his own views of
what would identify an individual as a homosexual rather than any
evidence presented."189 More specifically, the IJ determined that Mr.
Razkane would not be identified as a homosexual because "there was
nothing in Razkane's appearance that would designate him as being
gay because he did not 'dress in an effeminate manner or affect any
effeminate mannerisms."'190 In a footnote, the Court cautioned that
The [immigration judge] ended his fact-finding at this predicate stage because
he found that Razkane would not be identified as a homosexual and thus neces-
sarily not persecuted as such. The [immigration judge]'s finding that Razkane
would not be identified as a homosexual was not premised on Razkane's ability
to suppress indicia of homosexuality, a notion which has been severely criti-
cized. See Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163. 1173 (9th Cir. 2005); Hernan-
dez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on
other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005).
Were the [immigration judge] to have found that Razkane would be identified
as a homosexual, but nonetheless denied relief because Moroccan law crimina-
lizes homosexual conduct and not homosexual status, the status/conduct dis-
185 Karouni v. Gonzalez, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2005)
1 Id. at 1173.
187 Razkane v. Holder, 562 F.3d 1283,1288-89 (10th Cir. 2009).
18 Id. at 1287.
"9 Id. at 1287-88.
190 Id. at 1288.
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tinction drawn by the [immigration judge] would merit careful scrutiny. 191
Thus, although it has not expressly held that sexual identity alone
may constitute a particular social group under the asylum statute, the
Ninth Circuit has laid the groundwork for such a claim by rejecting
the distinction between homosexual acts and homosexual identity. 192
However, not all circuit courts agree with the Ninth Circuit in this re-
gard. 193 For example, in Kimumwe v. Gonzalez, the Eighth Circuit
applied the artificial distinction between homosexual acts and homo-
sexual identity to deny asylum.194 In that case, the Court held that
Kimumwe's past imprisonment was the result of a homosexual act-
luring another boy into a same-sex encounter-and not simply be-
cause of his status as a homosexual in Zimbabwe.195 Therefore, the
Eighth Circuit denied asylum purely because of Kimumwe's homo-
sexual acts. 196
Similarly, in an unpublished decision, the Fifth Circuit denied
asylum for a homosexual Tunisian man in part because there was no
evidence that he was persecuted for engaging in homosexual acts. 197
In Yacoubi v. Holder, the Court acknowledged that Yacoubi had suf-
fered beatings and name calling because of his status as a homosex-
ual, but ultimately relied on the fact that "there is no evidence that
Yacoubi was ever arrested, charged, or convicted of any crime for
any homosexual conduct."198
3. A Look to the Future: Insight from the United Kingdom
Thus far, the Supreme Court has not addressed this difference
between homosexual acts and homosexual identity in the context of
19 Id. at 1288 n.3 (emphasis added).
192 Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F. 3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005).
193 See O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 186. (stating "there has been little or no meaningful guid-
ance on what constitutes persecution on account of sexual identity for purposes of protection
under immigration laws. The few published federal courts of appeals decisions that have
addressed this issue have varied widely according to the judicial district where the case is
decided. These courts continue to hold an artificial distinction between persecution on ac-
count of homosexual status or identity which some circuits hold warrants protection. and pu-
nishment for homosexual acts, which some circuits hold does not warrant such protection.")
194 Kimumwe v. Gonzlaez, 431 F.3d 319, 322 (8th Cir. 2005).
195 Id. at 323.
196 id
197 Yacoubi v. Holder, 334 Fed. Appx. 660. 662 (5th Cir., 2009).
198 Id.
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asylum. 199 However, case law from the United Kingdom, another
common law country, is particularly instructive as to how the U.S.
Supreme Court may react when confronted with this issue.200
In March of 1999, the British House of Lords established that
those persecuted for their sexual identity (as opposed to their sexual
conduct), would constitute members of a particular social group and
thus be eligible for asylum in the United Kingdom.201 Nonetheless,
the distinction between homosexual acts and homosexual identity
persisted in British law and practice for many years. 202
The first case of a homosexual seeking asylum in the United
Kingdom, Regina v. Binasbi, considered the distinction between ho-
mosexual acts and homosexual identity.203 Consequently, the Court
rejected the asylum claim of a gay resident of the Turkish Republic of
North Cyprus.204 The Court stated, "in Cyprus there is no discrimina-
tion against homosexuals who are not active."205 A Cypriot law cri-
minalizing sodomy did exist, but the Court stated that Binasbi could
escape persecution as long as he did not engage in homosexual activi-
ty. 20 6 The Court further stated that Binasbi was not at risk for perse-
cution because of his homosexual identity; though his identity might
cause him to be the subject of ridicule, it did not amount to the level
of persecution. 207
Although a number of homosexuals have successfully sought
asylum in the United Kingdom since this decision, a 2002 decision by
the Court of Appeal regarding the asylum applications of three homo-
sexual Zimbabweans suggested that the sentiments behind Binasbi
remained alive and well.208 According to Outrage!, a British gay
rights organization, the three men's asylum claim was rejected by the
Court, which held that criminalization of sodomy does not amount to
199See Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010)("Our decisions
have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this context." (citing Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003)).
200 See Leitner, supra note 150, at 691.
201 See Sonia Purnell, Gay Asylum Charter Lords Ruling Could Trigger a Flood of Claims
for Refuge by Women and Homosexuals. DAILY MAIL. Mar. 26, 1999, at 17.
202 Leitner. supra note 150, at 691.
203 R. v. Binbasi, [1989] Q.B. 593 at 595 (Eng).204 Id. at 601.
205 Id. at 598.
206 Id. at 596-97.
207 Id. at 597. 600.
208 Id. at 692.
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a well-founded fear or persecution.209 In effect, this decision meant
that homosexuals could not base their asylum claims simply upon
their sexual identity, even though this directly conflicted with the
House of Lord's dicta in 1999.210
More recently, however, the British Supreme Court was con-
fronted with the issue of whether a homosexual applicant "could be
refused asylum on the grounds that he could avoid ill-treatment by
concealing his sexuality."211 The case involved the asylum claims of
two men, one from Cameroon and one from Iran.212 The man from
Cameroon, known as "T," appealed a decision that he could return to
his native country, even though he was previously "attacked by a
mob after he was seen kissing a male partner" by refraining from
such behavior.213 The Iranian man, known as "J," was told that he
could avoid persecution in his home country by concealing his homo-
sexuality.214 In Iran, "punishment for homosexual acts ranges from
public flogging to execution", and in Cameroon, punishment consists
of jail sentences that "range from six months to five years."215
In its decision, the British Supreme Court did away with the
Binasbi framework, and unanimously held that the two homosexual
asylum seekers would not to be deported from the United Kingdom
because they would be persecuted on account of their sexual identity
if they returned to their home countries.216 Although both T and J had
previously been denied asylum in the United Kingdom "because offi-
cials [found that] they could hide their [homosexuality] by behaving
discreetly," the Court decided to end the Home Office's217 controver-
sial policy of refusing asylum to homosexual refugees on the grounds
209 id.
210 pUrnell, supra note 201, at 17.
211 Stephen Howard, Gay Asylum Seekers Win Appeal to Stay, THE INDEPENDENT (July 7,
2010), available at http://www.independent.co.uldnews/uldhome-news/gayasylum-seekers-
win-appeal-to-stay-2020354.html. (Although this case is discussed in a variety of news ar-
ticles, the case is not cited by name or citation).
212 id.
213 id.
214 id.
215 id.
216 James Meikle, Gay Asylum Seekers Win Protection from Deportation, THE GUARDIAN
(July 7, 2010) http://www.guardian.co.ululd2010/jul /07/gay-asylum-seekers-rights-
deportation.
217 See About Us, THE HOME OFFICE, available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uldabout-us/
(last visited October 10, 2011) ("The Home Office is the lead government department for
immigration and passports, drugs policy, crime, counter-terrorism and police.").
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that they could avoid persecution by merely pretending to be hetero-
sexual.218 In the decision, Lord Hope, deputy president of the British
Supreme Court, explained that when the UN Convention on the Sta-
tus of Refugees was drafted in 1951, persecution on account of one's
sexual identity was not a recognized problem because many people
did not live an openly homosexual lifestyle, and some countries de-
nied the existence of homosexuality altogether.219 Hope stated:
This was manifest nonsense but at least it avoided the evil of persecution.
More recently, fanned by misguided but vigorous religious doctrine, the situa-
tion has changed dramatically. The ultra-conservative interpretation of Islamic
law that prevails in Iran is one example. The rampant homophobic teaching
that rightwing evangelical Christian churches indulge in throughout much of
sub-Saharan Africa is another . . . . [Homosexuality] is one of the most de-
manding social issues of our time. Our own government has pledged to do
what it can to resolve the problem. but it seems likely to grow and to remain
with us for many years. 220
One of the most important holdings in the British Supreme
Court case is the holding that forcing a homosexual "to pretend that
their sexuality does not exist or can be suppressed was to deny him
his fundamental right to be who he is."221 In order to implement this
new ruling, the Court established that in the future, immigration tri-
bunals must first decide, based on the evidence, whether an applicant
was homosexual, and second, if so, whether the applicant would face
persecution by living an openly gay lifestyle in his own country. 222 In
situations where an applicant would not be able to live an openly gay
or lesbian lifestyle, the applicant would satisfy the criteria for having
a "well-founded fear of persecution, even if [the applicant] could
avoid the risk [of persecution] by living discreetly.223 On the other
hand, if the applicant chose to conceal their homosexuality because
of social pressure, or, not wanting to upset family members or embar-
rass friends, then the tribunal should reject the application.224 Accor-
dingly, Theresa May, the Home Secretary for the United Kingdom,
218 id.
219 Meikle, supra note 216. at 2.
220 id
221 Robert Verkaik & Fionn Shiner. Why the Supreme Court Ruled Against the Deportation
of Gay Asylum Seekers, THE INDEPENDENT (July 8, 2010), available at
http://independent.co.uldnews/uk/home-news/why-the-supreme-court-ruled-against-the-
deportation-of-gay-asylum-seekers.
222 Meikle, supra note 216.
223 id.
224 id.
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stated that "[flrom today, asylum decisions will be considered under
the new rules and the judgment gives an immediate legal basis for us
to reframe our guidance for assessing claims based on sexuality, tak-
ing into account relevant country guidance and the merits of each in-
dividual case."225
Although gay rights organizations welcomed the recent Brit-
ish decision, many others in the United Kingdom expressed their dis-
approval.226 Those who objected to the decision voiced concerns
over opening the floodgates to a large number of asylum claims that
may be difficult to prove. 227 Nonetheless, the practical implications
of this recent British ruling may prove influential if and when the
U.S. Supreme Court directly addresses this issue in a sexual identity
asylum claim.
How this distinction between homosexual identity and homo-
sexual conduct will play out in American jurisprudence remains to be
seen, as the Supreme Court has not made any direct rulings address-
ing sexual identity and asylum. The decision in Lawrence v. Texas228
eliminates the argument that a homosexual asylum applicant could
not base a claim on persecution based on homosexual acts, such as
consensual sodomy in another country, because the United States no
longer permits the criminalization of sodomy.229 Thus, there is no
doubt that sexual identity claims based upon homosexual acts may
constitute a particular social group for asylum purposes. However, it
remains uncertain whether applicants can secure asylum if they iden-
tify as homosexual, but do not openly engage in homosexual acts.
Whether U.S. courts will unilaterally adopt homosexuality as
a social group classification remains to be seen, as different circuits
have differing definitions of what constitutes a particular social
group, and the Supreme Court has not addressed the matter. Indeed,
in homosexual asylum claims, "adjudicators can and consistently do
225 Verkaik and Shiner. supra note 221.
226 See. e.g.. PCC Receives Complaints over Media Coverage of Gay Asylum Case, PINK
NEWS. July 16. 2010. http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2010/07/15/pcc-receives-complaints-over-
media-coverage-of-gay-asylum-case/.
227 See, e.g.. Maureen Messent, Seekers Have Gay Old Time, BIRMINGHAM MAIL. July 16.
2010, available at http://www.birminghammail.net/birmingham-blogs-views/birmingham-
mail-columnists/maureen-messent/2010/07/16/seekers-have-a-gay-old-time-973 19-
26861360/.
228 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573, 577-78 (2002) (holding Texas's same-sex sodo-
my law unconstitutional).
229 id.
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reach opposite conclusions based on near-identical and conclusive
evidence."230 Based on an overall increased tolerance of homosexual-
ity in the United States in recent years, 231 there is no reason why the
Supreme Court should not allow homosexual identity to constitute a
particular social group for asylum purposes, or add sexual orientation
as one of the enumerated categories in the asylum statute.
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S PAST TREATMENT OF
CONTROVERSIAL SOCIAL ISSUES
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has been reluc-
tant to decide controversial social issues until it has become neces-
sary. 232 This is not to say that the Supreme Court does not decide di-
visive social issues; on the contrary, its jurisprudence contains many
decisions attempting to resolve difficult issues. 233 Rather, this article
argues that the Supreme Court does not typically stray much further
than where it views public opinion is currently aligned.234 In making
such a determination, the Supreme Court must first evaluate prevail-
ing social norms regarding the issue at hand.235 Although the Justices
themselves are far removed from the everyday concerns of most
Americans, they are fully aware which issues are at the forefront of
the nation's social and political agenda, and indeed often have their
own views on such issues. 2 36 Accordingly, the Justices tend to be
aware of when shifts in social norms occur and the Court is more
230 O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 206 (noting the inconsistency in asylum decisions highlights
the fact that homosexual asylum seekers are particularly vulnerable to the adjudicator's sub-
jective views on issues of sexual identity generally).
23 'Audrey Barrack. Gay Tolerance in U.S. Reaching Record Marks, THE CHRISTIAN POST,
May 29, 2007. available at www.christianpost.com/news/gay-tolerance-in-u-s-reaching-
record-marks-27674.
232 See WILLIAM STOREY, U.S. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 75 (2007).
233 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 393-94, 454 (1857) (holding that people
of African descent brought into the United States and held as slaves were not protected by
the Constitution and therefore could not be considered citizens), Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1957) (holding the segregation of public schools based on race was
unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,164-65 (1973)(holding that a Texas criminal
abortion statute was unconstitutional).
234 See David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission ofJudicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
859, 861 (2009) (analyzing "modernization" as an approach to judicial review, and stating
that such an approach involves the courts "strik[ing] down a statute if it no longer reflects
popular opinion or if the trends in popular opinion are running against it").
235 See id ("Modernization tries to anticipate developments in the law, invalidating laws that
would not be enacted today or that will soon lose popular support.").
236 Cordray & Cordray. supra note 49. at 441.
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likely to intervene after this shift has already taken place.237 In this
regard, the Supreme Court is seen as perfecting, rather than overstep-
ping, the democratic process. 238 Usually, such a change occurs before
the Court when there is "the right messenger with the right message
in the right social context."239 Indeed, as Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes observed, "the life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience."240
Typically, a normative shift regarding a controversial social
issue occurs in increments. 241 Initially, when a controversial social
issue first emerges society is reluctant to let go of its traditional
viewpoint; therefore, initial legal challenges on the controversial so-
cial issue in question tend to have little to no effect on legal
precedent.242 Once societal perceptions begin to change and a con-
troversial social issue reaches the mainstream, however, the Supreme
Court will begin to acknowledge the shift in public perception by ac-
cepting cases that acknowledge the new norm in a fact-specific man-
ner, setting the stage for an alteration of the previous norm. 2 43 In oth-
er words, what is considered "constitutional" often changes over
237 See Suzanne B. Goldberg. Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change and
Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 CoLUM. L. REv. 1955, 1961-62 at n.12 (2006).
238 See Strauss, supra note 234, at 893-94.
239 Gardina, supra note 132, at 292; see also Cordray & Cordray, supra note 51, at
327("Rather than asking whether he or she will win on the merits, the Justice instead would
ask whether it is necessary and expected that the United States Supreme Court should decide
this case or this issue at this time.").
240 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW I (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1881). (The remainder of the passage reads
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intui-
tions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which
judges share with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law
embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it
cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book
of mathematics. Id.)
241 Goldberg, supra note 237, at 1975.
242 Compare e.g., Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1995) (per curiam) with Loving v. Vir-
ginia. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967): compare Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186,194-45 (1986)
with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,578 (2003).
243 For example, note that ten years after its decision in Bowers, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged the rights of homosexuals as a class of citizens in Romer v. Evans. 517 U.S.
620, 635 (1996). Although Romer stood in obvious tension with Bowers, it set the stage for
Lawrence v. Texas, a decision the Court was not yet willing to make in 1996. See Goldberg,
supra note 237, at 1975.
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time. 24 4 As Justice Thurgood Marshall observed in City of Cleburne
v. City of Cleburne Living Center:
Courts ... do not sit or act in a social vacuum. Moral philosophers may debate
whether certain inequalities are absolute wrongs, but history makes clear that
constitutional principles of equality, like constitutional principles of liberty,
property, and due process. evolve over time; what once was a "natural" and
"self-evident" ordering later comes to be seen as an artificial and invidious con-
straint on human potential and freedom.245
For example, in Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court upheld the
"separate but equal" doctrine as constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment, defining race relations in the United States for the next
fifty-eight years. 246 The Court decided Plessy in 1896, but the ques-
tion of how to address race relations in the post-Civil War era was in
dispute for approximately thirty years before the Supreme Court in-
tervened.247 Though the decision is appalling to most Americans to-
day, the decision was well received at the time it was decided and re-
flected society's then-prevailing racist attitude.248
In the years following Plessy, American society increasingly
accepted racial equality, particularly in the Northern and Midwestern
states. 249 This shift culminated in the Court's 1954 decision in Brown
v. Board ofEducation, decided in 1954.250 In that case, the Supreme
Court overturned Plessy, and held that, in the context of education,
"separate but equal" deprived children of equal educational opportun-
ities, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.251 The Court explained that "[w]hatever may have been
the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Fergu-
son, this finding [that racially segregated schooling causes harm] is
244 Gardina, supra note 132, at 292.
245 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 US. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall, J., con-
curring in part. dissenting in part).
246 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) overruled by Brown v. Board of Education. 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
247 id.
248 See, RACE, LAW, AND CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN v THE BOARD OF EDUCATION 55
(Austin Sarat ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997); but see Plessy, 163 U.S. at 1144. 1146 (Harlan,
J. dissenting) ("In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite
as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case.").
249 Racial Tensions in Omaha African American Migration, NEBRASKA STUDIES, available at
http://nebraskastudies.org/0700/frameset reset.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).
250 Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 483. 495 (1954).
251 Id. at 494-95.
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amply supported by modem authority."252 Although the Supreme
Court did not expressly state the shift in public perception regarding
racial equality in its ruling, the decision makes clear that the decision
was in line with recent societal shifts on the topic.253 However, the
case was fact-specific to the public school system; it did not reflect a
complete rejection of racial inequality. 254
Notably, at the time Brown was decided, seventeen of the for-
ty-eight states required racial segregation in public schools, and six-
teen states prohibited it.255 Four more states had optional or limited
statutes regarding segregation, in which 40% of children were
enrolled in a segregated environment.256 Thus, at the time Brown was
decided, states adamantly clinging to segregation were in the minori-
ty.257
The line of interracial marriage cases also reflect this pat-
tern. 2 58 In the 1955 case Naim v. Naim, the Supreme Court declined
to invalidate Virginia's miscegenation statute. 259 At that time, half of
the nation's forty-eight states banned interracial marriage.260 Over
the next several years, however, several states appealed their misce-
genation statutes, reflecting a public opinion that was increasingly to-
252 Id. at 494.
253 Id.
254 See supra text accompanying note 251.
255 Robert L. Hayman, Jr. Nancy Levit, The Constitutional Ghetto, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 627,
665 (1993).
256 Kevin Brown. Termination ofPublic School Desegregation: Determination of Unitary
Status Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1105, 1128-29 (1990).257 id.
258 See Gardina, supra note 132, at 292.
259 Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955) (per curiam). In Aaim, the Supreme Court was
confronted with the issue of whether a Virginia miscegenation statute that had been upheld
by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was constitutional. Id. The Supreme Court va-
cated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for clarification of the record. Id.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. however, merely reaffirmed its earlier holding and
refused to clarify the record. Naim v. Naim. 90 S.E.2d 849. 850 (1956) (per curiam). Never-
theless, the Supreme Court declined to recall or amend the mandate. finding that the consti-
tutional question had not been "properly presented." Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985
(1956) (per curiam). This allowed the Virginia Court's decision finding its miscegenation
statute constitutional to remain in effect.
260 See Peter WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY WIFE: RACE, MARRIAGE, AND
LAW AN AMERICAN HISTORY 2 (Palgrave McMillian 2002) (stating that in 1958, all 17
southern states and 7 other states maintained miscegenation statutes).
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lerant of interracial marriages. 261 During this time, Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
drawing national attention to race relations and notions of racial
equality. 262
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided Loving v. Virginia, hold-
ing that statutes barring interracial marriage are unconstitutional.263
At this time, only sixteen states still had miscegenation statutes on the
books.264 The Supreme Court's decision in Loving, decided only
twelve years after Naim, clearly reflects the Court's reluctance to
declare interracial marriage, a controversial social issue, unconstitu-
tional when miscegenation statutes were in effect in 50% of the
states. 265 Once public perception tipped and only one third of the
states supported a ban on interracial marriage, the Supreme Court ac-
cepted the responsibility of shifting the law into accord with the ma-
jority opinion. 266
Accordingly, the Supreme Court was reluctant to get involved
in issues related to homosexuality for many years. 267 The 1969
Stonewall Riots are typically regarded as the foundation of the mod-
ern gay rights movement. 268 However, from 1969 to 1986, when
Warren Burger was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, "it managed
to reject or duck, and never accept, the constitutional claims brought
261 Id.
262 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2010) (prohibiting discrimination based on
race); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2010) (outlawing discriminatory voting
practices, which had prevented many African Americans from exercising their right to vote
pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment).
263 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
264 Id. at 6.
265 Girardeau A. Spann. Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133,1138 (2010) (indicating the
same Virginia miscegenation law was upheld in Aaim v. Aaim).
266 Loving, 388 U.S. at 6, 11-12. Just over 40 years after the decision in Loving, Barack Ob-
ama, the son of a white mother and black father, was elected President of the United States.
See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Kelly Reese, Reflections on Loving and Child-
ren 's Rights. 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 11, 11 (2009) (describing the effect of Loving on
the Obama family story).
267 See Gardina, supra note 132 at 300 (stating that. "the Supreme Court was much slower to
extend constitutional protections to sexual conduct between consenting adults of the same
sex.").
268 Police Again Rout 'Village' Youths: Outbreak by 400 Follows a Near-Riot over Raid,
N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 30, 1969, at 22 (describing the events of June 28, 1969, when New York
City Police raided the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village, a popular gay bar. The raid was
considered by many to be a senseless attack on the city's homosexual community. and ac-
cordingly, resulted in three days of riots in Sheridan Square).
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to it by homosexuals."269 When the Supreme Court was confronted
with the constitutionality of an anti-sodomy law in Bowers v. Hard-
wick in 1986, it upheld the statute. 270 The Court stated that "to hold
that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fun-
damental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching."271
Viewed against the backdrop of American society in the 1980's, the
Court's decision seems to reflect public sentiment.272 At the time that
case was decided, many in the United States had adopted a negative
opinion of homosexuality due to the AIDS epidemic, which was of-
ten referred to as the "gay plague."273 Furthermore, in the year Bow-
ers was decided, twenty of the fifty states had laws prohibiting sodo-
my.274
In 1996, the Supreme Court decided Romer v. Evans.275 In
that case, the Court held that an amendment to the state of Colorado's
constitution violated the Fourteenth Amendment when it provided for
a ban on antidiscrimination protections based on sexual orientation. 276
By taking this stance, the Court had to depart from its previous posi-
tion in Bowers that homosexuality was morally wrong. 277 Although
269 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Dis-
gust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REv. 1011, 1030 (2005). Eskridge goes on to state that, in
his opinion. "the Justices were homo-ignorant and believed the legitimacy of the judiciary
was at risk if they trumped anti-gay body politics with constitutional principle. Unfortunate-
ly, the Justices dodged gay rights in the clumsiest possible ways. and they ended up harming
their own institution more than they harmed homosexuals." Id. at 1031.
270 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986).
271 Id. at 197.
272 Gardina, supra note 132, at 300-01.
273 Id. See also Karen Moulding & National Lawyers Guild Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual &
Transgender Committee, Representing Clients with HIV/AIDS, in 2 SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW § 15:1, 15-5 (Roberta Achtenberg ed., West 2010) ("In the 1980s and early
1990s, the spread of HIV/AIDS was accompanied by media hysteria and a backlash against
efforts for lesbian and gay rights. Fear of HIV/AIDS contributed to a rise in homophobia.
which resulted in attacks on the civil rights of gay people; an increase in violent assaults of
gay men: and prejudice against people with HIV/AIDS."); see also Matthew Carmody,
Mandatory HIV Partner Notification: Efficacy, Legality, and Notions of Traditional Public
Health, 4 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 107, 109 (1999) (noting that "AIDS was initially only pre-
valent among homosexual men, Haitians, heroin addicts, and hemophiliacs").
274 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) ("The 25 States with laws prohibiting the
conduct referenced in Bowers are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only
against homosexual conduct.").275 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635(1996).
276 id.
277 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 96 (1986).
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the majority opinion did not directly confront or attempt to overrule
Bowers, instead basing its decision on the state's asserted interests, it
nonetheless set the stage for the Court to do so at a later date as pub-
lic opinion continued to evolve regarding issues of homosexuality. 278
Seven years after Romer, the Supreme Court reversed Bowers
in Lawrence v. Texas.279 In that case, the Supreme Court held that
"Bowers' deficiencies became even more apparent in the years fol-
lowing its announcement. The twenty-five States with laws prohibit-
ing the conduct referenced in Bowers are reduced now to thirteen, of
which four enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct."280
Thus, only a very small majority of states twelve and a half percent,
(12.5%), had laws expressly prohibiting homosexual conduct.281 In
the majority opinion, the Court specifically cited the shift in cultural
attitudes toward homosexuality, both in the United States and abroad,
as part of its justification for overturning Bowers.282 In a concurring
opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that "when a state makes homosex-
ual conduct criminal . .. that declaration in and of itself is an invita-
tion to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination ... ."283 Accordingly, Lawrence and this line of cases
also reflects a shift in prevailing social norms, and the Supreme
Court's initial reluctance to address the issue until a majority of the
public was in agreement with the newly established social norm. 284
More importantly, however, the decisions in Romer and Lawrence re-
flect the Court's "growing comfort with including gay men and les-
bians within constitutional protections previously afforded only to
their heterosexual counter parts."285
278 Although public opinion had evolved since Bowers, it still had a way to go before it was
the majority view. See, Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In holding that ho-
mosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the Court contradicts a deci-
sion, unchallenged here, pronounced only 10 years ago ... and places the prestige of this
institution behind the proposition that opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as ra-
cial or religious bias." (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96.)).
279 Lawrence. 539 U.S. at 578.
280 Id. at 573.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 576.
283 Id. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
284 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635(1996); see also Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 96 (1986).
285 Gardina supra note 132, at 297.
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Currently, there is much debate over whether the Supreme
Court should grant certiorari in a case involving gay marriage.286
However, as the cases above demonstrate, most legal scholars find
that the time is not yet right to petition the Supreme Court on the is-
sue.287 At present, there are six states-Connecticut, Iowa, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont-that allow for
gay marriage, as well as the District of Columbia.288 In Rhode Island
and Maryland, same sex marriages are recognized but not per-
formed.289 Several other states allow for civil unions and domestic
partnerships.290 However, there are twenty-four states that currently
286 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Gay-Marriage Lawsuits Escalate, USA TODAY, July 14, 2010, at
Al ; Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal -Is It Too Soon to Petition the Supreme Court on
Gay Marriage? NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 2010, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/01/18/100118fa fact talbot?currentPage=all.;
David G. Savage, Gay Marriage Supporters Fear Supreme Court's Ruling Was an Omen.
L.A. TEims. Jan. 17. 2010, at Al.
287 See Gardina. supra note 132, at 293, 308 (stating that in the context of Supreme Court
decision making "timing is everything.") and ("if the Court were to consider the issue today.
it is highly unlikely that the plaintiffs would succeed.").
288 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009): Goo-
dridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003): 2009 N.H. Laws 60; S.
5416, 234th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011); 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 33; 55 D.C. Reg. 6758
(June 20, 2008); see also Winning the Freedom to Marry: Progress in the States,
FREEDOMTOMARRY.ORG,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last visited July 25, 2010); see also Gardina supra
note 133, at 295.
289 Letter from Patrick Lynch, Attorney General, to Jack. R. Warner. Commissioner of the
Rhode Island Board of Governors for Higher Education, R.I. Op. Att'y Gen. (Feb. 20, 2007).
available at http://www.webcitation.org/5f9CDGPXH; Marriage - Whether Out-of-State
Same-Sex Marriage that is Valid in the State of Celebration May Be Recognized in Mary-
land, Md. Op. Att'y Gen. (Feb. 23, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/metro/documents/95oag3.pdf; see also Winning the Freedom to Marry: Progress in the
States, FREEDOMTOMARRY.ORG, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last visited July 25,
2010).
290 See Winning the Freedom to Marry: Progress in the States, FREEDOMTOMARRY.ORG,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last visited July 25, 2010). These states are Maine,
New Jersey, Delaware. Wisconsin, Colorado. California, Nevada, Oregon. Washington, and
Hawaii. California briefly allowed gay marriage between June 16, 2008 and November 4,
2008, but voters passed Proposition 8. a controversial ballot initiative that amended the Cali-
fornia Constitution to forbid gay marriage. Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5. Proposition 8 was chal-
lenged in the California courts, where it was upheld, then challenged in the Ninth Circuit,
which has sent the case back to the California Supreme Court to determine whether the third
party-defendants in the case had standing to intervene. Strauss v. Horton 207 P.3d 48 (Ca.
2009); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2010); Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
No. 10-16696 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4 2011). As of this article's publication, the California Su-
preme Court has heard oral arguments regarding the standing issue but has not yet released a
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have an anti-gay marriage constitutional amendment or legislation,
and nine states that although without an explicit ban, do not have any
sort of official same-sex relationship recognition. 291
Given the states' current positions on gay marriage, it is un-
likely that the Supreme Court is ready to issue a ruling shifting the
prevailing norm. As previously discussed, typically a judicial shift-
ing of a cultural norm must have the support of approximately 50%
of the states. 292 In other words, the Supreme Court typically reaches a
tipping point as to a particular social issue when society has as
well.293 At present, a majority of states simply do not favor gay mar-
riage, and legal scholars recognize that if the Supreme Court were to
accept certiorari based on these statistics, it would most likely rule
against the constitutionality of gay marriage. 294 Legal professor And-
rew Koppelman acknowledged that "[tihe overwhelming majority of
the states are still opposed to same-sex marriage . [and t]he Su-
preme Court is reluctant to take on the whole country."295
ruling. See Maura Dolan. Gay Marriage Foes May Win Right to Defend Prop. 8 in Court.
L.A. TIMEs. Sept. 7. 2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com/201 1/sep/07/local/la-me-
0907-prop8-20110907.
291 The states that currently have anti-gay constitutional amendments are Virginia, Ohio,
Michigan, Kentucky, Tennessee, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi,
Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma,
Texas, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Montana, and Alaska. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (2011); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (West): MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.1 (2011); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 402.020 (West 2011): TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-104 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-
15 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. §19-3-3.1 (2011): FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West 2011); ALA.
CODE § 30-1-19 (2011): MIss. CONST. art. XIV, § 263A; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89; ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-208 (2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §
14-03-01 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-38; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-101 (2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 3 (West 2011); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (West 2011); IDAHO CONST.
art. III. § 28; MONT. CONST. art. XIII. § 7; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25. The states that do not
have an anti-gay amendment or any protection for same sex couples are Wyoming, New
Mexico, Minnesota. Illinois. Indiana. Pennsylvania, West Virginia. North Carolina. and De-
laware. See Winning the Freedom to Marry: Progress in the States. FREEDOMTOMARRY.ORG.
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last visited July 25. 2010).
292 See Strauss, supra note 234, at 863 ("No one thinks that a court should strike down a law
if, for example, more than 50 percent ... of those who responded to a public opinion poll
disapproved of it.").
293 See Gardina, supra note 132, at 293 (noting that "Justices are unwilling to enter the de-
bate too early and short-circuit what Justice Breyer calls the 'national conversation"').
294 See Talbot, supra note 61, at Al, stating that "a loss [at the Supreme Court] could be a
major setback to the movement for marriage equality."
295 See Biskupic, supra note 286, at A3.
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Similarly, a number of gay rights organizations, including the
American Civil Liberties Union, Human Rights Campaign, Lambda
Legal, and the National Center for Lesbian Rights, issued a statement
also acknowledging that the time was not right to pursue gay mar-
riage at the Supreme Court.296 These organizations determined that
the likelihood of success on the merits was slim, because the "Su-
preme Court typically does not get too far ahead of either public opi-
nion or the law in the majority of states."297 These organizations
noted that when the Supreme Court previously addressed gay rights
ahead of a shift in public opinion, it took seventeen years for the
Court to revisit the issue.298 The organizations' statement provided
that "[a] loss now may make it harder to go to court later ... It will
take us a lot longer to get a good Supreme Court decision if the Court
has to overrule itself."299 The statement continued that many gay-
marriage supporters agreed that it would be wiser to wait until more
states adopted gay marriage laws.300 Based on the Court's history of
waiting to address controversial social issues, such as gay marriage,
until the issue is supported by a majority of the states, it appears that
the organizations' statement is prudent policy. 301
V. WHY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SHOULD DECIDE A SEXUAL IDENTITY
ASYLUM CLAIM
"Whether or not they affirm the status quo, courts deciding
cases in which social norms are contested often go to great lengths to
frame their decisions as following, rather than intervening in, the
public debate."302 Accordingly, although it is clearly premature for
the Supreme Court to address gay marriage, (that is, assuming that
the objective is a change from the traditionalist view of marriage), it
is not premature for the Supreme Court to make an incremental deci-
sion that sets the stage for such a ruling. Given the circuit splits re-
296 Talbot, supra note 61. at Al.
297 id.
298 Id. Bowers v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 186, 186; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558.
299 Talbot, supra note 61. at Al.
300 id.
301 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT 14-15 (1st ed., Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2009) ("The Court will get
ahead of the American people on some issues ... On others, such as gay rights, it will lag
behind.").
302 Goldberg, supra note 237, at 1984.
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garding sexual identity asylum claims, as well as the public's increas-
ing tolerance of homosexuality and attention to immigration in gen-
eral, it is the appropriate time for the Supreme Court to accept certi-
orari on this important issue.303
Regarding homosexual asylum claims, the issue is primarily
ripe for the Supreme Court because of the existing circuit splits.304
Most notably, the circuits remain split on how to define many key
terms that are integral to deciding homosexual asylum claims, such as
"persecution" and "particular social group."305 Further, some circuits
continue to draw an artificial distinction between persecution on ac-
count of homosexual status or identity, and punishment for homosex-
ual acts. 306 These divisions amongst the circuits have persisted for
many years, and because homosexual asylum claims have been stea-
dily increasing in number over the past decade and do not show any
signs of decreasing,307 the Supreme Court should set standard defini-
tions for all of the circuits to apply. Consistent definitions of these
terms would ensure that homosexual asylum claims would be adjudi-
cated uniformly and thus fairly. 308
Although reasonable jurists will often disagree about compli-
cated legal issues and it will inevitably take some time for such issues
to reach the Supreme Court, litigation over immigration issues have
arguably decreased in quantity over the last several years. 309 Though
the Justice Department has been confronted with numerous homo-
sexual asylum seekers who have not received equal treatment from
the circuit courts, it has not sought Supreme Court review of any of
these cases.310 It is, in part, the Justice Department's duty to identify
important federal law issues and present them for review to the Su-
303 O'Dwyer. supra note 9. at 191.
304 See supra text accompanying n. 11.
305 Birdsong, supra note 89, at 389.
306 O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 186.
307 Id.
308 See. e.g.. Julia Preston, Wide Disparities Found in Judging Asylum Claims. N. Y. TIMES.
May 31, 2007. at Al; Tod Robberson. Asylum Seekers at the Mercy ofInconsistent Courts,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 1. 2007. at Al.
309 See Brent E. Newton, Lopez v. Gonzalez: A Window on the Shortcomings ofthe Federal
Appellate Process, 9 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 143, 172 (2007); see generally John R.B.
Palmer, The Nature and Causes ofthe Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts ofAppeals:
A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 13, 30 (2006-07); see generally Peter H.
Schuck & Theodore Hsien Wang, Continuity and Change: Patterns oflmmigration Litiga-
tion in the Courts, 1970 1990, 45 STAN. L. REV. 115.177 (1992).
310 See Newton. supra note 309. at 172-73.
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preme Court.311 Accordingly, in an effort to remedy the perceived
problems in immigration claims, a sexual identity asylum claim
should be presented to the Supreme Court immediately. Further, be-
cause one of the Supreme Court's primary duties is to resolve circuit
splits, the Court should accept certiorari in such a case.312 To keep up
with our nation's notions of equality and fairness, the Supreme Court
should also accept certiorari in a sexual identity asylum claim be-
cause such a case involves a pertinent social issue, albeit one that is
not as fiercely debated or polarizing as gay marriage. Similarly, al-
though there is currently much debate about illegal immigration in
the United States, asylum is a far less controversial aspect of immi-
gration law than other recent immigration developments that the Su-
preme Court seems poised to address.313
In a recent decision that did not pertain to immigration law
and only indirectly involved gay rights, the Supreme Court itself
seemed to set the stage for addressing such a sexual identity asylum
claim.314 In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, the Supreme Court
addressed whether "a public law school [could] condition its official
recognition of a student group-and the attendant use of school funds
and facilities-on the organization's agreement to open eligibility for
membership and leadership to all students."315 The Supreme Court
explained that the Christian Legal Society (CLS) advocated that sex-
ual activity should not occur outside of marriage, and that marriage
was only between a man and a woman, thus excluding from the or-
ganization "anyone who engages in unrepentant homosexual con-
duct."316 CLS argued that it did not exclude individuals because of
their sexual orientation, but rather on their beliefs that certain conduct
311 Id. at 173.
312 See Nunez v. U.S.. 128 S. Ct. 2990, 2991 (2008) ("the main purpose of our certiorari ju-
risdiction was to eliminate circuit splits, not to create them.") (Scalia. J.. dissenting); Hart-
man v. Moore. 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) ("We granted certiorari, to resolve the Circuit
split.") (internal citations omitted); Concrete Works of Colorado. Inc.. v. City and County of
Denver. Colorado. 540 U.S. 1027.1033 (2003) ("the case is worthy of the Court's review be-
cause it presents a clear Circuit split").
. See, e.g., Joe Garofoli. Californians reevaluate Arizona boycott plans. SAN FRANcIsco
CHRONICLE, July 29, 2010, at Al0 (noting that "The federal court ruling ... that set aside
key provisions of Arizona's controversial immigration law ... is likely only the next step in
a battle destined for the Supreme Court").
314 O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 186.
315 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971. 2979 (2010).
316 Id. at 2981 (internal citations omitted).
2011] 445
446 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XV:2
was wrong.3 17 The Supreme Court responded by stating that "[o]ur
decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in
this context."318
Although the statement that the Supreme Court would not dis-
tinguish between status and conduct "was resolutely bland and nicely
hidden in a long Supreme Court decision," many gay rights activists
have recognized this statement as a "time bomb."319 More specifical-
ly, this statement prepares the Supreme Court to more directly speak
to a gay rights ruling, i.e., the logic of the statement that there is no
distinction between status and conduct can be exploited in a later de-
cision. The statement is also significant because it reflects a shift in
the Supreme Court's opinion, in that it appears to continue toward the
trend of being more gay-friendly.320 In gay rights cases "the court has
chosen its words with care over a long period of time . . .. If read
properly, this decision should have an impact all over gay rights juri-
sprudence both because of the specific rejection of the status-conduct
distinction and the shift in tone."321 Accordingly, several scholars
have stated that the opinion is positive for future gay rights cases. 322
Although most of the scholars who addressed the case discussed the
status/conduct distinction in terms of gay marriage,323 the analysis is
also clearly applicable to homosexual asylum claims, where the sta-
tus/conduct distinction is the direct cause of most of the circuit
splits.324
Additionally, homosexual asylum claims are ripe for Supreme
Court adjudication because of the recent ruling in the United King-
dom allowing two homosexual asylum claims, and rejecting the
117 Id. at 2990.
"8 Id. (citing Lawrence. 539 U.S. at 575) ("When homosexual conduct is made criminal by
the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination.") (emphasis added); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by
this law is conduct that is closely correlated to being homosexual. Under such circums-
tances, [the] law is targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons
as a class."); ef Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic. 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) ("A
tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.")).
" Adam Liptik, Looking for Time Bombs and Tea Leaves on Gay Marriage. N.Y. TIMES,
July 19, 2010, at All.
320 Id. (noting that Martinez was the only case argued that term in which Justice Anthony
Kennedy joined the Court's more liberal justices).
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 id.
324 O'Dwyer. supra note 9. at 186.
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Court's previous status versus conduct distinction.325 Although the
United States and the United Kingdom have separate legal systems,
the Supreme Court will at times engage in "reason borrowing" when
comparable issues are raised in a similarly situated foreign court.3 26
As noted by former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "there is much to
learn from other distinguished jurists who have given thought to the
same difficult issues that we face here."327 In the context of homo-
sexual asylum claims in the United States, the recent developments in
British law provide strong supporting authority for a similar decision
to be made here.328 Indeed, because many in the United States regard
the nation as a leader on human rights issues, the country should at
least adopt a policy on sexual identity asylum claims that is equiva-
lent to the rights afforded to homosexual asylum seekers in the Unit-
ed Kingdom. 329
VI. CONCLUSION
Thus, the time is ripe for the Supreme Court to accept a ho-
mosexual asylum claim. Although the Supreme Court must delicate-
ly balance popular opinion with the adverse effects of circuit court
splits, the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez, as well as the British Supreme Court's recent rulings, re-
flects that the balance has shifted in favor of addressing the issue. As
explained above, abolishing the homosexual acts versus conduct dis-
tinction that some circuits still apply in sexual identity asylum claims
325 See Gay Asylum Seekersfrom Iran and Cameroon Win Appeal, BBC NEWS (Jul. 7, 2010),
available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10180564.
326 See John Parsi, The (Mis) categorization of Sex in Anglo-American Cases of Transsexual
Marriage. 108 MICH. L. REv. 1497, 1515-16 (2010) (quoting Justice Breyer. "[W]e find an
increasing number of issues, including constitutional issues, where the decisions of foreign
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will not garner as much media attention as would a ruling on gay
marriage or the state of Arizona's illegal immigration bill. However,
it will keep the Supreme Court on course to further develop these im-
portant social issues, while not stepping out of line with public opi-
nion. Although the Supreme Court prefers not to make a decision un-
til it has to, for the reasons outlined above, it should now make a
decision on sexual identity asylum claims.
